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This paper evaluates the implications of Eastern EU enlargement with the use of a computable 
general equilibrium model. The focus is on accession to the Single Market, with explicit modelling 
of the removal of border costs and costs of producing to different national standards. The results 
indicate  significant  welfare  gains  for  the  CEECs  (volume  of  GDP  increases  by  1.4-2.4%)  and 
modest gains for the EU. The steady state scenarios, which allow for the capital stock adjustment 
in response to higher return to capital, more than double the static welfare gains.  
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1. Introduction1 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the economic implications of enlargement of the European 
Union (EU) to include the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). It is a commonly 
accepted view that further integration with the European structures will be beneficial to the CEECs 
in a political and economic sense; however the estimates of the potential economic gains vary 
widely. Even though the impact of EU accession will be advantageous for the applicant countries 
as a whole, many sectors will actually see their production decreasing and some employees might 
see their wages declining in relative terms. The objective of this study is to estimate the scale and 
nature  of  the  structural  adjustments  resulting  from  accession  by  quantifying  its  impact  on 
production, employment and wages in different sectors of new members’ economies.  
The  focus  is  on  technical  barriers  to  trade  (TBT),  as  by  the  end  of  2002  all  tariffs  on 
manufacturing goods will be removed in accordance with the Europe Agreements. Access to the 
Single  market  is  defined  as  adoption  of  the  EU  standards  and  removal  of  internal  borders. 
Business surveys conducted before completion of the Single Market indicated that simplification of 
border formalities and harmonisation of product and safety standards were viewed as the most 
important internal market barriers. The removal of these barriers is therefore likely to be also the 
major benefit of accession for the CEECs. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly presents previous studies on EU-
CEECs’  integration  and  discusses  the  ways  in  which  this  paper  contributes  to  the  literature. 
Section 3 describes the model. The next section discusses the process of enlargement and how it 
is translated into experiments conducted in this study. Sections 5 and 6 present the static and long 
run results of the adoption of the Common External Tariff (CET), customs union and Single Market 
access. The next section includes sensitivity analysis. The last section puts the results of this study 
into the perspective of the results of existing empirical work.  
Finally, a large part of important material was relegated to appendices for the sake of clarity of 
presentation. Appendix A provides equations, description of the model, parameters and calibration. 
Appendix B discusses the data on protection employed in this study and compares it with data 
used in most of the previous computable general equilibrium studies. It also describes the creation 
of benchmark equilibrium and presents the most important economic features of the regions at the 
time of enlargement. Appendix C looks at the importance of technical barriers to trade in the EU 
and  in  trade  between  the  CEECs  and  the  EU.  Appendices  are  available  from  the  author  on 
request. 
                                                  
1 I would like to thank my supervisors Professor A. Smith and Professor L.A. Winters; and Dr M. Gasiorek for helpful 
comments and suggestions. I also benefited from comments received at the GTAP Fifth Annual Conference on Global 
Economic Analysis in Taipei in June 2002. All interpretations and remaining errors are my own responsibility.  
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2. Previous studies of EU-CEECs’ integration 
Most studies conducted so far focus on the economic effects of the eastern enlargement of the 
EU on the current member states. The implications of the accession for the CEECs are given less 
attention. A brief discussion of the previous studies is presented below. 
Winters and Wang (1994) quantify the expected results of the Europe Agreements focusing on 
sensitive sectors: iron, steel, clothing and footwear. They conclude that there are substantial gains 
for the CEECs from this trade liberalisation.  
Winters (1994) focuses on the steel industry. Looking at what would have happened if the 
Europe Agreements (EA) existed in 1992 and allowing complete steel liberalisation, he found out 
that it would have led to substantial gains for EU consumers, and for CEECs’ producers.  
Rollo and Smith (1993) use a computable partial equilibrium model to analyse the effects of 
the EAs, focusing on sensitive sectors. They show that even a huge increase in CEECs’ exports of 
other sensitive products will have a diverse, but not a significant impact on current member states. 
They also analyse the inclusion of the CEECs into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  
Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1994) model the economic impact of the increased trade with 
the CEECs on the EU within the computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework. They conclude 
that  even  a  substantial  trade  growth  will  have  little  influence  on  the  output  and  welfare  in  EU 
countries. 
However, the studies by Brown et al. (1995), Baldwin et al. (1997), Francois (1998) and Forslid 
et al. (1999) focus on the economic implications of the integration for the CEECs. The results of 
these studies will be discussed in greater detail in the section presenting the results of this study. 
Brown  et  al.  (1995)  use  a  CGE  model  to  evaluate  the  implications  of  Poland-Hungary-Czech 
Republic-EU integration on economic welfare, trade, output, employment by sector as well as the 
real returns to capital and labour in the CEECs and the EU. They model the effects of reduction of 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and the rationalisation of the production process by capturing 
scale economies and increasing product variety. The results suggest that as a result of integration 
the CEECs will experience substantial economic welfare gains. The impact on output, wages and 
employment in the CEECs is unequally distributed among sectors. In Czechoslovakia and Poland 
output and employment tend to expand across virtually all sectors. Hungary exhibits a great degree 
of specialisation with some sectors expanding and some declining. 
Baldwin et al. (1997) analyse the implications of the elimination of all trade barriers between 
CEECs and the EU, adoption of the common external tariff and accession to the Single Market in a 
CGE framework. According to their estimates, all European regions gain from the enlargement and 
the  CEECs  gain  much  more  in  relative  terms.  The  authors  also  model  the  implications  of  a 
decrease  of  investment  risk  in  the  CEECs  and  increase  of  their  capital  stock  as  a  result  of 
accession.  When  the  accumulation  effects  are  taken  into  account  the  expected  gains  for  the 
CEECs are much higher.   
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Francois’s (1998) paper is based on a similar model to Baldwin et al. (1997). It also looks at 
the impact of free trade between the EU and the CEECs, the reduction in transaction costs and 
decreased investment risk in the CEECs. However, Francois (1998) decomposes the impact of 
accession  into  static  allocation,  accumulation  and  pro-competitive  effects.  This  allows  him  to 
conclude that major gains for the CEECs come from the accumulation of capital and efficiency 
gains following the integration of imperfectly competitive industries. Francois (1998) stresses that 
long  run  benefits  to  the  CEECs  will  be  connected  with  deep  structural  adjustments,  as  some 
sectors will see their output decreasing by as much as 90% of the benchmark level.   
Forslid et al. (1999) study the effects of increased integration between CEECs and the EU by 
modelling a 5% fall in import barriers, export subsidies and transport costs. Similar to the previous 
studies,  the  results  show  that  further  integration  between  the  two  regions  produces  significant 
welfare gains to the CEECs, while the EU gains are small. Exports from the CEECs are expected 
to  increase  across  all  manufacturing  sectors,  with  production  shifting  towards  labour-intensive 
products. 
The  existing  research  does  not  provide  a  comprehensive  picture  of  the  implications  of 
accession  for  the  individual  applicant  countries.  The  study  by  Brown  et  al.  (1995)  models  the 
implications of free trade area and not accession. In the models of Baldwin et al. (1997), Francois 
(1998) and Forslid et al. (1999), seven CEECs are treated as an entity and therefore it is not 
possible to assess the impact of accession on individual countries. Furthermore, the modelling 
work is based on data from 1992 or older. However, probably the main weakness of the empirical 
work conducted so far is that it does not include an implicit modelling of the Single Market, but 
employs the somewhat arbitrary assumption of an across-the-board equal reduction of real costs of 
trade. The consequences of enlargement for employment and relative wages of manual and non-
manual workers are not analysed either. 
The  above  shortcomings  must  have  also  led  other  authors  to  the  conclusion  that  more 
research on accession was needed, as a more recent study by Lejour, de Mooij and Nahuis (LMN, 
2001) – published only after I started my work – deals with most of the above limitations. This 
paper looks at the implications of formation of a customs union, accession to the Single market and 
labour  migration.  Due  to  the  use  of  protection  levels  from  the  Global  Trade  Analysis  Project 
(GTAP) database the Europe Agreements form part of the EU accession scenario.2 The authors 
estimate the impact of the Single market on trade with the use of gravity equations. LMN (2001) 
compare the trade intensity between the EU members with two otherwise equivalent countries, 
which are not members of the EU, to calculate potential trade flows between the EU  and the 
CEECs following the Single market enlargement. Then the potential trade increases per sector are 
translated into Samuelsonian iceberg trade-cost equivalents of the barriers (non-tariff barriers). The 
abolition of those non-tariff barriers in the CGE model results in trade flows that correspond to 
predictions from the gravity model. The derived barriers to trade differ significantly between sectors 
                                                  
2 The GTAP database does not incorporate the provisions of the Europe Agreements and the Uruguay Round (UR) 
commitments.  
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and  vary  between  0%  (Metals,  Other  Manufacturing,  Raw  Materials)  and  17%  (Agriculture). 
Sectors, where the potential impact of the Single market access on trade is the highest include 
Trade  Services  (17.2%),  Textiles  and  Leather  (14.5%),  Non-metallic  Minerals  (13.1%)  and 
Transport Equipment (11.4%).  
My modelling exercise differs in three major ways from that of LMN (2001). Firstly, I employ the 
actual pre-accession protection data on trade between Poland, Hungary and the EU based on the 
World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  Trade  Policy  Reviews.  Tariff  margins  are  a  crucial  factor 
influencing the results of trade policy experiments, therefore the construction of data and definition 
of policy experiments require careful consideration. Based on the actual protection levels in 1997 
and the subsequent tariff liberalisations I simulate benchmark equilibrium at the time of accession.3 
Secondly, I model border and standards costs explicitly as additional transport costs and value 
added in production respectively, while LMN (2001) employ tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers. 
To this end I employ estimates of these barriers in the pre-1992 EU. Finally, I assume imperfectly 
competitive behaviour in selected sectors, which seems to be a more realistic assumption as to the 
nature of competitive interactions between firms in several industries.   
3. The model 
The model employed in this study is a standard static computable general equilibrium model. It 
includes several price-wedge distortions such as factor taxes in production, value-added taxes, 
import  tariffs  and  export  subsidies.    Factor  taxes  in  production  and  value-added  taxes  remain 
unchanged  in  simulations.  Production  involves  combination  of  intermediate  inputs  and  primary 
factors  (capital,  skilled  and  unskilled  labour).  We  assume  a  Constant  Elasticity  of  Substitution 
(CES)  function  over  primary  factors  and  a  Leontief  production  function  combining  intermediate 
inputs with factors of production composite. Primary factors are mobile across sectors within a 
region,  but  immobile  internationally.  Each  region  has  a  government,  whose  revenue  is  held 
constant at the benchmark level and a single representative consumer. The trade balance is also 
held constant in counterfactual simulations. 
Demand for final goods arises from a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The demand structure is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Within each region, final and intermediate demands are composed of the 
same Armington aggregate of domestic and imported varieties. The composite supply is a nested 
CES function, where consumers first allocate their expenditures among domestic and imported 
varieties  and  then  choose  among  imported  varieties.  In  the  imperfect  competition  case  firm 
varieties enter at the bottom of the CES function. This approach allows for the differentiation in 
preferences for home and imported goods. The special form of this demand structure is firm level 
product differentiation. It requires the assumption that all elasticities of substitution between firms 
and  products  are  equal.  Demand  is  then  represented  by  a  single  level  CES  function  with  all 
domestic and imported varieties competing directly, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
                                                  
3 For details see Appendix B.   
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Figure 1. Demand structure in the IRTS scenario – firm level product differentiation within an 
Armington aggregate 
Variety 1 Variety 2 Variety 3
Domestic Composite
Variety 1 Variety 2 Variety 3
EU Goods





Source: HRT (1996a). 















Source: HRT (1996a). 
There is strong empirical evidence for modelling selected sectors as imperfectly competitive 
(e.g. Pratten, 1988). Increasing returns to scale (IRTS) in production are assumed in 15 out of 26 
industries. These sectors generate around 40% of value added in Poland and Hungary. Production 
in IRTS sectors requires a fixed cost and marginal cost is assumed to be constant. Firms act as 
Cournot competitors and free entry and exit ensures zero profits. Section 3 in Appendix A covers 
derivation of markup equations and calibration of equilibrium conditions in IRTS sectors, as well as 
the values of the returns to scale employed. 
A  detailed  description  of  the  model  equations,  calibration  and  parameters  employed  is 
provided  in  Appendix  A.  It  is  based  on  the  MRT  –  Multiregional  Trade  Model  –  by  Harrison, 
Rutherford  and  Tarr  (HRT)  implemented  in  their  evaluation  of  the  impact  of  completion  of  the 
Single Market (HRT, 1994 and HRT, 1996a). The HRT model is modified in the sensitivity section. 
My  application  includes  fifteen  regions  and  twenty  six  sectors,  of  which  seventeen  are 
manufacturing industries.  
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The data originates from the Global Trade Analysis Project Version 5 database, which includes 
the national and regional input-output structures, bilateral trade flows, final demands pattern and 
government intervention benchmarked to 1997. The GTAP protection data does not incorporate 
the  preferential  trade  agreements  between  the  EU  and  the  CEECs  (Europe  Agreements)  and 
between  the  CEECs  themselves  (Central  European  Free  Trade  Area,  CEFTA).  Therefore,  the 
protection data is first updated based on the 1997 applied tariffs and imposed on the initial set of 
the social accounting matrices (SAMs). Then the impact of further trade liberalisation between 
1997 at the time of accession is modelled with the use of a CGE model described above. The 
resulting set of accounting matrices is referred to as the benchmark.  
Appendix B includes a detailed description of trade protection of Poland, Hungary and the EU 
in 1997 and at the time of accession and differences in protection data employed in this study and 
as reported in GTAP. These differences are substantial and the use of the updated tariff rates has 
a crucial impact on the results of this modelling exercise. The following sections of Appendix B 
present the methodology employed in the creation of the benchmark equilibrium and the main 
characteristics of Poland, Hungary and the EU at the time of enlargement. The discussion of trade 
penetration  by  sectors  and  differences  in  factor  shares  in  value  added  allows  for  better 
understanding of the welfare implications of enlargement and its impact on industrial structures.  
4. Defining accession. 
The admission of CEECs to the EU can be viewed as a three-stage process. The first step is 
full  integration  into  the  customs  union  with  the  freedom  of  movement  of  non-CAP  goods,  of 
services and of capital. The second step is a full integration of the CEECs into the CAP and free 
movement of labour. The last step is economic and monetary union. Ideally, the quantification of 
the impact of accession on the CEECs should capture all of the above elements of membership. 
However, as discussed by Smith et al. (1995) or Mayhew (1998), the accession of the CEECs to 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to come at a much later stage of integration. Full 
integration into the CAP will be preceded by a ten-year transition period, during which prices of 
agricultural products and income support to producers will be gradually adjusted to the EU level.4 
The modelling of the whole process of accession would be extremely difficult, as it would involve a 
lot of guessing and forecasting of the long-term developments in the CEECs and the EU. It is 
therefore sensible to concentrate the modelling effort on the following factors, which will come in 
the early stages of accession:  
·  integration into the customs union, which will involve elimination of all remaining 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and adoption of the Common External Tariff 
by the CEECs, 
                                                  
4 The long-term reform of the CAP has been agreed upon and accession negotiations have been concluded, but 
those issues were not resolved yet when I did my work.  
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·  accession to the Single Market, which will lead to the reduction in real transaction 
costs as a result of simplification of border formalities, harmonised product and 
safety standards, similarity of business environment etc.  
In what follows I will use the term “accession” to refer to enlargement of the customs union and 
the Single Market.   
4.1 Formation of the customs union 
The  first  development  in  formation  of  the  customs  union  was  negotiation  of  the  Europe 
Agreements  (EAs)  with  the  associated  countries.  Poland  signed  an  Association  (Europe) 
Agreement with the EU in December 1991. The agreement became fully effective in February 
1994. The EA aimed to establish a free trade area over a maximum period of ten years. Polish 
industrial exports have benefited from duty free treatment since January 1995, except for coal, 
steel and textiles, which were granted duty free access in 1996 and 1997 respectively. Poland 
eliminated duties on industrial products imported from the EU on 1 January 1999, except for steel 
and petroleum on which duties were abolished in 2000, and automobiles on 1 January 2002. In the 
case of agricultural products the EA included reciprocal concessions in the form of reduced tariffs 
on a number of products and increased quotas (WTO, 2000). Hungary also negotiated its trade 
agreements  with  the  EU  in  December  1991.  The  content  of  EAs  was  broadly  similar  for  all 
associated countries. The EU eliminated the majority of its tariffs on industrial products imported 
from  Hungary  by  1992.  The  tariffs  on  sensitive  products  other  than  textiles  and  clothing  were 
abolished on 1 January 1995. Duties on textiles and clothing were removed on 1 January 1997 and 
quantitative restrictions were abolished a year later. As of 1 January 1998 Hungarian goods have 
enjoyed duty free access to the EU market. Hungary eliminated its duties in two steps i.e. on 1 
January  1994  and  1997.  Hungary  still  kept  duties  on  “sensitive”  products  such  as  chemicals, 
textiles  and  clothing  and  steel  products.  The  complete  elimination  of  duties  on  EU  industrial 
imports  took  place  on  1  January  2001.  Trade  in  agricultural  goods  is  also  being  liberalised  in 
accordance with the EAs and new agreements on reciprocal concessions (see Appendix B for 
details). The accession itself will lead to complete elimination of the remaining tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers in trade between the CEECs and the EU.  
In addition, the CEECs will adopt the Common External Tariff (CET) applied by the EU in trade 
with the third countries. After the Uruguay Round (UR) tariff bindings, the majority of Polish and 
Hungarian duties still exceed those applied by the EU (see Figure 3). The average post-UR tariff 
for industrial goods weighted by most favoured nation (MFN) imports amounts to 2.9% in the EU, 
6.9% in Poland and 6.7% in Hungary (Finger, Ingco and Reincke, 1996). Only the Hungarian tariffs 
on imports of Clothing, Petroleum, Chemicals and Non-metallic Minerals are lower than the EU 
tariffs. The protection of Hungary is significantly higher than that of the EU in the case of imports of 
Motor Vehicles, Machinery and Equipment and Other Transport Equipment. In Poland the same is 
true in the case of Leather, Iron and Steel, Clothing, Metal Products, Paper and Motor Vehicles. A  
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significant structural adjustment may take place in sectors where protection will be greatly reduced 
after the adoption of the CET.  
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Source: See section 1 Appendix B. 
The next step in the creation of the customs union involves the abolition of tariffs and export 
subsidies on trade in agricultural and food products between Poland, Hungary and the EU. Tariffs 
in food and agriculture applied by Poland and Hungary on EU products are much higher than the 
respective tariffs of the EU. In addition Poland and Hungary are small relative to the EU so they are 
likely to benefit more than the EU from the abolition of trade restrictions. Of those two, Hungary 
exports a much larger share of its output (see Table 6 of Appendix B), so it is likely to benefit more 
than Poland from improved access to the EU market. 
4.2 Single Market Access 
One  of  the  studies  ordered  by  the  European  Commission  before  completion  of  the  Single 
Market looked at the perception of EC producers as to the importance of barriers to be removed by 
the formation of the Single Market. It showed that the elimination of physical frontiers, costs and 
delays, harmonisation of national standards and regulations, and government procurement were 
the most important barriers to trade before 1992 (see Table 1). Elimination or lessening of these 
impediments to trade is also likely to bring major benefits to the CEECs when they gain Single 
Market access. Therefore in modelling the Single Market access I follow HRT (1996a) by focusing 
on reduction in border costs and delays, as well as reduction in costs of compliance with varying 
national standards and regulations.  
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Table 1. Perceived importance of internal market barriers (ranks) 
Total industry  EUR12 
National standards and regulations  2 
Government procurement  1 
Administrative barriers  8 
Physical frontier delays and costs  3 
Differences in VAT  6/7 
Regulations of freight transport  6/7 
Restrictions in capital market  5 
Community law  5 
Q: How important do you consider these barriers to be removed? 
1 = most important   8 = least important 
Source: European Commission (1987). 
4.2.1 Border costs 
One of the most observable barriers to trade is due to the existence of borders and customs 
formalities, which involve delays and various kinds of administrative costs. At the moment all goods 
from the CEECs exported to the EU and vice versa are stopped at the EU border for customs 
clearance.  Following  enlargement  the  customs  and  fiscal  controls  in  trade  with  the  EU  will  be 
conducted directly from firms’ offices. However, due to restrictions on the movement of persons in 
the  first  years  following  enlargement  there  will  remain  some  costs  related  to  the  existence  of 
physical borders.  
According to Cawley and Davenport (1988, Tables B2 and A3), the unweighted average of the 
border costs before completion of the Single Market amounted to 1.7 % of the total amount traded. 
In order to update those figures to the post-Single Market 1997 values, I use the results of the 
survey from European Commission (1997b). This study includes the results of a large business 
survey, where firms were asked to evaluate the Single Market’s effect on delays at the borders. 
According to this survey 56% of firms believed that the Single Market had a positive effect by 
eliminating  delays  at  the  borders.  I  follow  Hoffmann  (2000)  in  assuming  that  the  proportion  of 
border costs removed in a given country equals to the share of positive responses from given 
country  firms.  Therefore  if  the  initial  trade  cost  amounted  to  1.7%  and  56%  of  this  cost  was 
eliminated, the post 1992 border cost amounts to 0.75, i.e. 1.7-(1-0.56) = 0.75. This constitutes an 
upper bound of the possible elimination of border costs as this calculation assumes that for those 
firms where the Single Market had a positive impact on elimination of border costs, the border 
costs were eliminated completely. Border costs in all remaining regions of the model i.e. in all 
countries except for the EU are assumed to be equal to 2%. 
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Table 2. Border Costs Before and After 1992 in the current member states 
Exporter  Border costs before 1992 as 
a per cent of total exports 
Post-1992 border costs 
Austria  1.3  0.65 
France  1.437  0.632 
Germany  1.562  0.687 
Greece  1.5  0.75 
Great Britain  1.176  0.788 
Italy  1.378  0.524 
Netherlands  1.441  0.778 
Portugal  1.379  0.593 
Spain  1.451  0.348 
Rest of the EU  1.508  0.329 
Source: see text. 
Border costs are modelled as additional purchases of a domestic transportation good, which 
includes shipping, handling and warehousing for customs purchases. With the establishment of the 
customs union, these costs will be greatly reduced.  
4.2.2 Standards costs 
The EC has been concerned with the elimination of the technical barriers to trade since its 
creation. However, the major effort of elimination of barriers to trade imposed by differing national 
regulations and standards was undertaken with the creation of the Single Market. Appendix C 
includes a detailed discussion of standards and technical regulations and the importance of those 
barriers in trade between the EU and the CEECs. 
The Single Market measures consist of 2,556 different mandated standards. This number rises 
to more than 20,000 when voluntary standards are considered. By October 1997 the number of 
standards  approved  in  all  EU  member  states  amounted  to  only  32%  of  the  total  number  of 
mandated standards. The process of implementing standards is slow, as in the survey conducted 
for the European Commission only 39% of the businessman in the EU believed that the Single 
Marked had eliminated barriers to trade, while 20% believed that it had no effect (EC, 1997). In 
1998 only 25% of the intra-EU trade was free from any technical barriers to trade (Brenton et al. 
2001). 
HRT  (1996a)  and  Hoffmann  (2001)  assume  that  the  sum  of  border  and  standards  costs 
amounts to 2.5% and calculate the costs of compliance with foreign standards as the residual 
between 2.5% and border costs discussed above. This approach seems rather arbitrary. I follow a 
different approach by using the rough numbers from the Cost of Non-Europe study (European 
Commission,  1988).  Based  on  the  extensive  interviews  of  EC  firms  the  costs  of  obstacles  to 
transborder activity were expressed as a per cent of turnover. One of the obstacles considered  
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were technical standards. The authors assign to each industry a number between 0 and 4. In this 
index “0” indicates no costs implied by a given barrier, “1” corresponds to a cost of less than 1% of 
turnover and indicates that respondents experience a significant but not prohibitive nuisance, and 
“4”  indicates  a  cost  of  3%  or  more  and  significant  barriers  to  trade.    The  resulting  costs  of 
standards and technical regulations before completion of the Single Market are presented in Table 
3 below (column 3 and 4 are useful in further discussion). 
Table 3. Standards cost rate before and after 1992 
  Standards Cost Rate in the EU (%)  Exports as a share of total exports 
(%) 
  1988  1997  Hungary  Poland 
Agriculture  2  0  3  1 
Raw materials  1  0  3  30 
Food  2  0  6  5 
Textiles  1  0  2  2 
Clothing  1  0  4  5 
Leather  1  0  2  3 
Wood  1  0.7  2  6 
Paper  1  0.3  1  2 
Petroleum  1  0  1  2 
Chemicals  2  1.2  8  5 
Non-metallic Minerals  1  0.7  2  2 
Iron, steel  1  0.6  1  3 
Other metals  1  0.5  2  3 
Metal prod.  1  0.6  2  3 
Motor vehicles  2  1.6  10  3 
Other transport equipm.  3  1.3  1  1 
Electronics  3  2.2  13  2 
Machinery n.e.c.  2  0.4  14  8 
Manufacturing n.e.c.  1  0.7  2  3 
Utilities   1  0.2  2  1 
Trade  1  0.4  2  2 
Transport  1  0.2  4  6 
Financial services  1  0.2  6  5 
Source: columns 1 and 2: see main text, columns 3 and 4: pre-accession levels in Table 6 of Appendix B. 
These numbers need to be updated to their post-Single Market values. To this end I employ 
the same methodology as Hoffmann (2001). In evaluating the size of reduction of technical barriers 
he takes into account two measures. These are the number of ratified standards related to each  
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directive as a share of the total number of mandated standards5 and the index of harmonisation of 
regulations produced by the European Commission (1997c) and discussed in Appendix C. Based 
on these two pieces of information, Hoffman (2001) produces an estimate for each sector of how 
far the internal market has reduced the standards costs (see Table 4 for details). The post-1992 
level of standards costs is reported in column 2 of Table 3.  
In several sectors a full harmonisation is assumed. This is the case of food and agriculture, 
where  the  task  of  harmonising  has  been  going  of  for  many  years  and  where  the  standards 
organisations  report  almost  full  harmonisation  in  1997.  This  is  also  true  in  sectors  which  are 
regulated by the mutual recognition principle such as beverages and tobacco, textiles and clothing, 
leather and others. In the benchmark equilibrium (1997) the costs of technical regulations and 
standards in CEECs-EU trade is assumed to be equal to the pre-1992 EU values (first column of 
Table 3). 
Table 4. Number of standards implemented in each sector 
Sector  Measures 
Share of technical 
barriers removed (%) 
Agriculture  Harmonised food regulation  100 
Raw materials  MRP  100 
Food  Harmonised food regulation  100 
Textiles  MRP  100 
Clothing  MRP  100 
Leather  MRP  100 
Wood  None  35 
Paper and printing  Packaging and waste directive, European 
Copyright system  75 
Petroleum  MRP  100 
Chemicals  Detailed directives and MRP  40 
Non-metallic Minerals  CPD  25 
Iron, steel  Standards (Construction products (CPD))  35 
Other metals    45 
Metal products  CPD, Public procurement  45 
Motor vehicles  Harmonised regulation  20 
Other Transport Equipment  Harmonised regulation and public 
procurement  55 
Electronic equipment  Standards (Machinery Directives)  25 
Machinery n.e.c.  Standards (Machinery Directives)  25 
Manufacturing n.e.c.    25 
Utilities   None  25 
                                                  
5 The information about sectors regulated by mandated standards is obtained from CEN (1997), CENELEC (1997) 
and ETSI (1997) and the number of ratified standards as a share of total mandated standards is as of June 1997.  
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Trade    55 
Transport    80 
Financial services    80 
Source: Hoffmann (2001), Table A2. 
The differences in technical regulations and standards, which vary between domestic and the 
EU markets, require producers to manufacture or package goods in forms, which are different than 
for  their  domestic  markets.  Standardisation  costs  therefore  increase  the  cost  of  production  for 
exports and they are modelled as additional value added in each sector where trade takes place. 
This  approach  ignores  the  fixed  cost  elements  of  implementation  of  new  standards.  However, 
these  are  mostly  one-off  investments  and  their  magnitude  is  not  likely  to  be  significant  (see 
Appendix C for more discussion).  
5. Results of the static experiments 
There  are  several  reasons  why  we  should  expect  the  enlargement  to  be  beneficial  to  the 
CEECs and the EU. The reductions in barriers to trade and transport costs decrease the prices of 
goods for consumers, as well as prices of intermediates and capital goods for producers. The 
extent of these gains depends on the amount of trade between the trading partners and the trade 
creation  and  trade  diversion  effects.  Apart  from  increased  efficiency  of  resource  allocation,  as 
demand  shifts  to  regions  with  the  lowest  cost  suppliers,  additional  gains  stem  from  increased 
competition. However all gains from trade also involve adjustment costs and may be associated 
with potentially painful restructuring in the CEECs and significant redistribution effects.  
On the export side lower barriers and costs of trade may lead to higher foreign demand for 
domestic products and therefore higher prices of domestic goods depending on the supply side 
response.  While  increased  domestic  prices  have  a  welfare  decreasing  effect  on  domestic 
consumers, they may lead to an improvement in the terms of trade (TOT), which is a source of 
potential welfare gain. However, a fall in the prices of imported intermediate goods is likely to result 
in a positive supply response and a possible fall in prices of domestic goods. So the overall effect 
depends  on  the  increase  in  demand  for  exports  and  the  extent  to  which  domestic  consumers 
substitute  imports  for  domestic  goods.  The  resulting  change  in  the  terms  of  trade  cannot  be 
predicted a priori. 
In the case of imperfectly competitive industries a further effect on resource allocation can be 
identified - i.e. the exploitation of economies of scale as fixed costs are spread over a larger output 
and average costs decrease. When tariffs on imports fall, imports become relatively cheaper and 
consumers substitute away from domestic products. In the short run when the number of firms is 
fixed, the demand schedule faced by domestic producers shifts down. Domestic firms lose market 
share in the home market and have to lower their markups on domestic sales. Unit costs are now 
higher than price and firms are not able to cover the fixed costs. This results in firms exiting the  
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industry and output per firm of the surviving firms increasing as they slide down their average cost 
curves.  
In all experiments presented in this paper I model the impact of greater integration with the EU 
of  only  Poland  and  Hungary.  The  first  reason  is  that  the  CEECs-5  aggregate  contains  three 
countries which are first wave candidates (the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) and some 
which are likely to become EU members at some later stage  (Romania and Bulgaria). However 
the  main  reason  for  not  including  the  CEECs-5  is  that  the  data  on  trade  protection  of  those 
countries  was  not  available  to  the  author.  As  in  the  case  of  Poland  and  Hungary  there  are 
considerable differences between tariffs reported by GTAP and applied tariffs in 1997. Modelling 
the impact of accession in the CEECs-5 would overstate the true impact of enlargement if the initial 
protection data were too high. In concentrating on the implications of enlargement for Poland and 
Hungary we illustrate the possible impact on the second wave of applicants left outside the EU for 
some more years. Leaving the CEECs-5 outside the EU in the experiments does not affect the 
results  for  Hungary  and  Poland,  as  simulations  not  reported  here  show  there  are  virtually  no 
spillovers between those regions. 
5.1 Adoption of the Common External Tariff 
Welfare implications of the adoption of the CET by Poland and Hungary are presented in Table 
5.  In  the  IRTS  scenario  Poland  gains  0.27%  (equivalent  variation  as  a  percent  of  GDP)  and 
Hungary  gains  just  0.16%,  while  welfare  changes  in  other  regions  are  close  to  nil.  Poland 
experiences larger welfare gains, because its external tariffs are much higher than those of the EU 
and so there are more efficiency gains to be reaped. The welfare impact of the adoption of CET is 
not big, because trade with the rest of the world (ROW) accounts for less than one third of total 
trade of Poland and Hungary. In addition the adjustments in sectoral outputs are also modest.  
Table 5. Welfare effects of the Customs Union (equivalent variation as a percent of GDP): 
  Common External Tariff  CEt and free trade in cap goods 
  CRTS  IRTS  CRTS  IRTS 
EU15  -0.01  -0.01  0  0 
Austria  -0.006  -0.007  0.001  0.007 
Rest of the  EU  -0.01  -0.011  -0.006  0.002 
France  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.001 
Germany  -0.011  -0.012  -0.002  0.005 
Great Britain  -0.006  -0.004  -0.004  0 
Greece  -0.004  -0.003  0.001  0.008 
Portugal  -0.005  -0.004  -0.008  -0.007 
Spain  -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  -0.001 
Italy  -0.007  -0.006  -0.006  -0.001  
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Netherlands  -0.013  -0.013  -0.005  0.017 
Hungary  0.114  0.161  1.585  1.717 
Poland  0.237  0.27  0.96  1.031 
CEECs-5  -0.005  -0.007  -0.031  -0.031 
Former Soviet Union  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.002 
Rest of the World  0.004  0.008  0.002  0.006 
Source: Model simulations. 
Table 6 reports the sectoral impact of the adoption of the CET in Poland and Hungary. Output 
changes  in  all  other  regions  are  very  small,  only  in  few  cases  exceeding  1%.  Following  the 
adoption of the CET goods from the ROW become relatively cheaper compared to domestically 
produced goods. ROW exports of agricultural and food products to Poland and Hungary increase 
substantially. As a result domestic production in those sectors falls, except for food in Hungary, 
where the production increases slightly due to lower agricultural prices. Increased competition on a 
domestic  market  coupled  with  cheaper  intermediate  inputs  reduces  the  prices  of  most 
manufacturing goods in Poland and Hungary. Lower prices raise demand for Polish and Hungarian 
products  abroad  and  lead  to  production  and  exports  expansion.  In  Poland  sectors  enjoying 
significant production expansion include Other Metals, Iron and Steel, Wood, Motor Vehicles and 
Clothing. In Hungary major expansion of output is recorded in production of Electronic Equipment, 
Motor Vehicles, Machinery and Equipment. These are mainly sectors where the share of exports in 
production and tariffs’ reductions following the imposition of CET are the highest. 
Table 6. Sectoral effects (relative changes in output) of the adoption of the CET and in the customs 
union scenarios (IRTS scenario). 
  CET  CET and Free Trade in CAP Goods 
  Hungary  Poland  Hungary  Poland  France  Germany  UK  Italy 
Agriculture  -1.1  -1.9  15.7  1.4  -0.2  0.4    -0.2 
Raw materials  0.2  0.5  -9.1  -1.4  0.3  -0.1    0.1 
Food  0.5  -1.3  53.3  13.6  -0.7  -0.6  -0.3  -0.3 
Textiles  -0.5  0.4  -9.7  -5.2  0.1  -0.3    -0.1 
Clothing  -0.6  1  -14  -5.3  0.1  -0.4     
Leather  -1.3  -3.7  -14  -7.5  0.1  -1.1  -0.1  -0.3 
Wood  -0.4  1.5  -9.2  -3.9  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1 
Paper  -0.5  -0.4  -4.8  -1.7    0.1     
Petroleum  -0.5  0.1  -1.5  -0.5         
Chemicals  -0.7  -0.3  -7  -3.6  0.1  0.2     
Non-metallic Min.  -0.1  0.4  -6.5  -2.8  0.1  0.1    0.1 
Iron, steel  0.3  1.7  -6  -3.9  -0.1  -0.2    0.1 
Other metals  -0.1  3.7  -8.9  -2.1  0.2  -0.1  2.1  0.4 
Metal products  -0.2  -0.3  -8.3  -4.2  -0.1  -0.1    0.2  
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Motor vehicles  3.4  1.9  -2.8  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2    -0.1 
Other transport 
equipment 
1.2  -1.4  -6.9  -4.3  0.2  0.5  -0.1  -0.1 
Electronics  3.7  -0.9  -3.5  -4.7  0.1    -0.1   
Machinery n.e.c.  2.3  0.1  -7.6  -4.3    -0.1    0.2 
Manufact. n.e.c.  -1  -1.6  -6.9  -3.8    -0.1  0.1  0.1 
Utilities   -0.2    -1.1  -1         
Construction  0.4  0.4  1.2  -0.3         
Trade  0.1    0.3  -0.3         
Transport  1.2  0.1  0.2  3.1  0.1  0.2    0.1 
Financial services  -0.2  0.1  -2.1  -1.5         
Note: Sectors in bold are subject to IRTS. Source: Model simulations. 
Table 5 also presents welfare implications of the adoption of the CET under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale (CRTS). The differences in welfare implications between CRTS and IRTS 
are  very  small  in  this  experiment.  As  already  noted  above,  the  additional  gains  arise  from 
rationalisation in the use of fixed costs and a decrease in consumption deadweight loss due to 
lower markups. Output changes under CRTS (not reported here) have the same sign as under the 
assumption  of  IRTS,  but  the  magnitude  of  output  changes  under  IRTS  is  generally  larger  in 
absolute  terms.  Therefore  it  seems  that  traditional  determinants  of  resource  allocation,  factor 
intensities and taxes play a crucial role in influencing industrial structures. Shifts in relative costs 
that  occur  in  CRTS  provide  an  impulse  for  output  fall  or  expansion.  If  policy  changes  lead  to 
expansion of output in a given sector, then under IRTS this results in a decline of average cost and 
price with output expanding even further. 
5.2 Impact of the Customs Union 
As  mentioned  above,  the  Europe  Agreements  provide  for  the  complete  elimination  of 
protection in trade in manufacturing goods by the time of accession. Therefore the second scenario 
looks at the implications of formation of the Customs Union, where in addition to the adoption of 
the CET by Hungary and Poland barriers to trade in food and agricultural goods between the EU 
and Poland and Hungary are eliminated. In the IRTS scenario the expected welfare gains increase 
to 1.7% of GDP in Hungary and 1% of GDP in Poland (see Table 5). Protection levels in food and 
agriculture are very high in the benchmark equilibrium (see Appendix B). In addition all countries 
provide  export  subsidies  in  agriculture  and  food  processing,  with  EU  export  support  being  the 
highest (GTAP, 2001). Therefore, the abolition of all barriers to trade results in major changes in 
output of agricultural and food products (see Table 6).  
In Poland, the substantially lower tariffs on agricultural goods from ROW result in much higher 
imports from this region and only a small increase in production of agricultural goods. In addition, 
since only a small share of output is exported, sales to foreign markets cannot provide a significant  
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boost  to  domestic  production.  In  Hungary,  which  had  initially  lower  tariffs  on  ROW  imports  in 
agriculture and exports a large share of its output to the EU, the situation is quite different. Here 
better access to the EU market leads to a significant increase in production of agricultural products. 
However, the production of food rises in both countries, as in addition to better access to the EU 
market, the prices of major inputs - i.e. agricultural goods - fall significantly. Again the rise in food 
production in Hungary is much higher than in Poland, because Hungary exports a large share of its 
output to the EU and has a positive trade balance with the EU in this sector. 
As a result of the adoption of the CET the protection of manufacturing goods falls and imports 
from  the  ROW  become  relatively  cheaper.  This  exerts  downward  pressure  on  the  prices  of 
manufacturing products in Poland and Hungary. Lower prices of manufactures should lead to an 
increase in exports, but expanding food and agricultural sectors attract factors of production away 
from industry leading to a fall in production of all manufacturing goods. The transport sector enjoys 
a modest increase in output due to rise in trade flows, which increases demand for transportation 
services. 
In  most  EU  countries  the  impact  on  production  is  almost  negligible.  However,  France, 
Germany and Italy record a small increase in production of Other and Transportation Equipment 
and the UK increases production on Non-Ferrous Metals. Exports from these countries to other EU 
members replace imports from Poland and Hungary. 
This scenario seems too extreme, as with output quotas imposed by the EU on new member 
states, food production in Poland and Hungary will not be allowed to expand by 14%-53%. In 
addition  the  marketing  ability  of  the  CEECs’  producers  and  the  quality  of  food  products  will 
severely limit the ability of expansion of Polish and, to a lesser extent, Hungarian food sales in the 
EU. One more significant factor, which will hamper such an expansion of exports of agricultural 
and food products of Poland and Hungary to the EU, is the fact that the price advantage of CEECs’ 
products  has  been  eroded  significantly  since  1997.  Not  only  are  domestic  prices  rising  with 
increasing domestic support, but also the real appreciation of national currencies also increases 
the prices of Polish and Hungarian products in euros.  
Negotiations on quotas on production, direct payments to Polish and Hungarian farmers and 
the conditions of the market access between the candidate countries and the EU were still not 
concluded when this analysis was conducted. However, given the focus on manufacturing and 
therefore the level of sectoral aggregation chosen for this model it would have been impossible to 
incorporate the most important elements of the CAP for agricultural and food products. However, 
the results of the customs union scenario provide a rough estimate of possible implications of the 
abolition of protection on CAP products and the tremendous pressures within the CAP.  
                                                                       Studies & Analyses No. 273 – Maryla Maliszewska 
23 
5.3 Impact of the Single Market 
This section presents the implications of the elimination of border and standards costs. Border 
costs are similar to import tariffs, because they also raise the price of exports in the foreign market. 
Therefore  a  decrease  in  border  costs  has  a  similar  impact  on  integrating  regions  as  a  tariff 
reduction. It leads to trade creation and trade diversion and changes in the terms of trade. It also 
affects the incentives to invest. There are, however, two major differences as compared to the 
impact of tariffs. The first is that border costs do not generate any revenue to the government and 
their reduction leads to terms-of-trade gain. A bilateral reduction of these costs may lead to TOT 
gains in both regions. As border costs are included in the cif price of imports, but not in the fob 
price of exports, a reduction in border costs raises the price of exports relative to the price of 
imports. The second difference is that border costs are symmetric, so that their reduction induces 
fiercer competition on the home market and a better competitive position on the foreign market. 
This is also the case of standards costs. They increase the cost of production for exports and their 
reduction simultaneously improves home country firms’ positions in foreign markets and exposes 
them to more intense competition at home.  
In the Single Market scenario I look at the implications of a symmetric reduction in border and 
standards costs between Poland, Hungary and the EU. The impact of accession on the costs of 
compliance  with  national  standards  and  regulations  requires  more  discussion.  Most  foreign 
companies that invested in the region already incorporate the necessary requirements. This is also 
the  case  of  producers  already  exporting  to  the  EU,  whose  products  already  comply  with  EU 
regulations.  For  those  firms  accession  to  the  internal  market  is  likely  to  reduce  the  costs  of 
compliance due to greater availability of the conformity assessment centres in the home countries 
and  greater  competition  between  them.  The  Union  has  begun  to  sign  European  Conformity 
Assessment  Agreements  with  the  associated  countries.  These  agreements  establish  that  the 
CEECs can propose conformity assessment centres and testing laboratories for particular product 
groups  for  testing  by  EU  experts,  with  a  view  to  their  acceptance  by  the  EU  as  registered 
assessment  centres.    Products  declared  as  complying  with  national  standards  in  these  home 
based centres will be allowed to be traded within the internal market. This is likely to shorten the 
time required to obtain a declaration of conformity with national regulation and lower the costs of 
this process. In addition, products approved for sale in the EU could be also exported to other new 
member states without any additional certification.  
On the other hand, for small Polish and Hungarian firms which have been producing only for 
domestic  market,  the  introduction  of  EU  regulations,  in  some  cases  stricter  than  domestic 
regulation, may impose additional investment. A certain part of this investment will be undertaken 
in the normal course of replacing existing equipment over the coming years.   However, in some 
cases the costs of compliance may be significant, e.g. in the dairy industry. A study of a small 
sample of manufacturing firms was conducted by the Polish research institute (IKCHZ, 2002). It  
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indicates that firms that already comply with the EU regulations needed between 6 months to 3 
years to obtain necessary certificates and adjust production processes. The estimated costs of 
compliance amounted to about 0.5%-2% of the firms’ annual sales. The small and medium firms 
which do not comply yet with EU regulations will also benefit from the establishment of the network 
of conformity assessment centres and lower costs of getting products certified in conformity with 
national regulation. Despite significant costs, the small firms are likely to benefit most from the 
ability to export to the enlarged EU, as three quarters of small firms declare that foreign standards 
and technical regulations are the major barriers to their exports to the EU. In addition they will be 
able  to  place  their  products  on other  CEECs’  markets  without  any  additional  costs  due  to  the 
uniformity of regulations. 
Overall, it seems likely that all firms will experience some reduction in standards costs. This 
was certainly the case of the EU firms with completion of the internal market. In the business 
survey of several industrial sectors, commissioned by Eurostat as a part of the 1997 Single Market 
Review (European Commission, 1997b), between 23.6% and 48.8% of respondents in various 
industries replied that the Single Market has decreased the costs of testing and certification. A 
much smaller number of respondents believed that the Single Market increased the costs of testing 
and  certification.  This  answer  was  given  by  between  3.5%  and  12.3%  of  firms  from  different 
industries, with the exceptionally high share of 21.8% in case of manufacture of office machinery 
and  computers,  where  40.7%  of  firms  believed  to  the  contrary.  So  overall  in all  industries  the 
majority of respondents declared that their standards cost have fallen. This is also what I believe 
will happen in case of Polish and Hungarian firms with the EU accession.  
At the same time, EU firms will benefit from harmonisation of standards and regulations in the 
CEECs, as they will no longer need to alter their products in order to comply with the national 
regulations. Since I do not have any prior expectations as to whether the EU firms will be gaining 
better access to the CEECs’ markets at a faster pace or not, I simply assume that reductions in 
border and standards costs are symmetrical in terms of fraction of costs being dismantled as a 
result of the Single Market. I study the impact of reduction of these costs by 25, 50, 75 and 100%. 
Table 7. Welfare effects of elimination of border and standards costs (equivalent variation as a 
percent of GDP) 
  ACC25  ACC50  ACC75  ACC100  ACC25  ACC50  ACC75  ACC100 
  CRTS  IRTS 
EU15    0.01  0.01  0.02    0.01  0.01  0.02 
Austria  0.014  0.029  0.046  0.064  0.017  0.036  0.056  0.079 
Rest of the EU  0.004  0.008  0.013  0.018  0.004  0.009  0.014  0.02 
France  0.001  0.002  0.004  0.005  -0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003 
Germany  0.006  0.014  0.022  0.031  0.006  0.015  0.025  0.036 
Great Britain  0.001  0.003  0.005  0.007  0.002  0.004  0.005  0.007 
Greece  0.004  0.006  0.009  0.013  0.004  0.007  0.01  0.014 
Portugal  0.002  0.003  0.004  0.005  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.003  
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Spain  0.002  0.003  0.005  0.007  0.001  0.003  0.005  0.006 
Italy  0.001  0.004  0.008  0.011  0.004  0.007  0.011  0.015 
Netherlands  0.005  0.011  0.017  0.024  0.006  0.012  0.019  0.026 
Hungary  0.473  0.975  1.508  2.074  0.537  1.108  1.717  2.367 
Poland  0.277  0.571  0.881  1.208  0.313  0.643  0.991  1.358 
CEECs-5  -0.013  -0.026  -0.038  -0.051  -0.015  -0.028  -0.041  -0.054 
FSU  -0.004  -0.007  -0.009  -0.012  -0.005  -0.008  -0.011  -0.014 
ROW    -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.003 
ACC25 – 25% reduction in border and standards costs 
ACC100 – 100% reduction in border and standards costs 
Source: Model simulations. 
A complete reduction of the border and standards costs is quite unrealistic. In the case of 
standards  costs,  the  Single  Market  has  not  eliminated  completely  differences  in  national 
regulations (see also Appendix C), so it is quite unlikely that accession will lead to full elimination of 
these costs for the CEECs. With border controls on the movement of people and perhaps CAP 
goods in place during transition period, border costs will neither be completely eliminated as a 
result of accession. It is also possible that there exists some level of border and standard cost 
below which these costs cannot be reduced any further, as engaging in exports might be always 
slightly  more  costly  than  production  for  domestic  market.  Therefore  the  AC100  (complete 
elimination of border and standards costs) presents the upper bound of the possible welfare gains, 
however the gains of this magnitude may not materialise. Table 7 presents welfare implications of 
the Single Market access.  
The  impact  of  the  Single  Market  by  far  exceeds  the  impact  of  adoption  of  the  CET. 
Consecutive elimination of border and standards costs leads to gains proportionate to the size of 
reduction.  When  production  for  exports  becomes  equally  costly  as  domestic  production  the 
expected welfare gains amount to 1.7% of GDP in Hungary and to 1.1% in Poland. There are two 
reasons while Single Market access generates much higher welfare gains as compared to the 
adoption of the CET despite the fact that the magnitude of border and standards costs is much 
smaller  than  the  level  of  external  tariffs  of  Poland  and  Hungary  before  accession.  The  major 
difference  is  that  the  CET  applies  to  a  much  smaller  amount  of  trade,  as  trade  with  the  EU 
accounts for roughly 70% of Polish and Hungarian trade flows. Secondly, access to the internal 
market  involves  reduction  of  real  costs  of  trade  for  all  trading  partners,  while  tariffs  reflect 
distortions in relative prices accompanied by government revenue. 
The gains from Single Market access are higher for Hungary than for Poland. This is because 
standards costs are higher in sectors where Hungarian comparative advantage lies (see Table 3). 
The  highest  standards  costs  are  recorded  in  sectors  which  account  for  the  highest  share  of 
Hungarian exports. This is the case of Electronic Equipment, Machinery and Equipment and Motor 
Vehicles. Also, Hungary is much more open than Poland so that a larger share of its trade is 
affected by the removal of NTBs (see Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix B).   
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Among the EU countries the major gains are recorded in Germany, Austria, Netherlands and 
Italy. These are the member states that trade most with the CEECs. The regions left outside the 
increasing integration zone suffer slight welfare losses due to trade diversion. As products from 
Poland and Hungary face improved access to the EU market, their major competitors from CEECs, 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and ROW are put at a disadvantage.  
Finally, Table 8 presents the sectoral implications of the Single Market access. To restate, the 
reduction of border and standards costs leads to fiercer competition at home and better access to 
foreign  markets.  This  via  various  linkages  of  consumption,  investment  and  intermediate  input 
demand affects production structures of the countries involved. The lowering of real costs of trade 
reduces  the  prices  of  intermediate  inputs,  decreasing  the  costs  of  production.  The  resulting 
changes in factor prices further affect the costs of production. The overall effect depends on trade 
intensity of sectors, input-output linkages and comparative advantage of regions. 
Output of several sectors increases substantially as a result of Single Market access.  This is 
at  the  expense  of  most  service  sectors,  Raw  Materials,  Paper,  Chemicals  and  Non-metallic 
Minerals. In Hungary the highest increase is recorded in Electronic Equipment and Motor Vehicles. 
These  are  export-oriented  sectors,  where  exports  account  respectively  for  82%  and  72%  of 
production.  In  addition  initial  standards  costs  are  relatively  high  in  those  sectors,  so  that  their 
reduction  generates  greater  incentives  for  export  expansion.  In  these  industries  the  impact  of 
better access to the EU market outweighs the negative impact of increased competition at home. 
This is also the case of Other Metals, Motor Vehicles, Clothing and Textiles in Poland. 
Output in most service sectors in Poland and Hungary falls. This is due to two factors. Real 
trade costs in services are low - i.e. 1% - and trade in these sectors is rather small, so there are 
few  incentives  for  output  expansion.  In  addition,  as  a  result  of  strong  expansion  of  some 
manufacturing industries, factors of production move away from services. The impact of the Single 
Market on these sectors is therefore determined by input-output linkages and relative profitability. 
As the overall GDP level increases, some expansion is recorded in selected service sectors such 
as Construction and Trade. 
Table 8. Output changes in selected countries resulting from a 50% and 100% reduction in border 
and standards costs (IRTS scenario) 
  ACC50  ACC100 
  Hungary  Poland  Hungary  Poland  Austria  France  Germany 
Agriculture  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1  0.2 
Raw materials  -2.5  -0.1  -4  -0.4  -0.2  -0.1  -0.1 
Food  0.9  0.1  1.8  0.2  0.1     
Textiles  0.4  2.2  0.3  5  0.7  0.1  0.6 
Clothing  1.2  5.3  1.3  11.1  0.7  -0.1  0.1 
Leather  2.1  0.2  3.4  0.6  0.1  0.1  0.8 
Wood  1.1  1.9  2.3  3.9  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1 
Paper  -1.1  -2.1  -2.4  -4.1  0.3  0.1  0.2  
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Petroleum  0.1  -0.8  0.4  -1.6  -0.1  0.1  0.2 
Chemicals  -2.2  -1.7  -4.6  -3.3  0.6  0.1  0.2 
Non-metallic Min.  -1.6  -0.9  -3.7  -1.8  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Iron, steel  3.3  1.3  7.1  2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1 
Other metals  5.7  5.7  12.1  8.9  0.4  -0.2  -0.1 
Metal products  1.7  1  3.6  1.5  0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Motor vehicles  17  6.5  38.6  14.7  -0.2  -0.3  -0.1 
Other transport 
equipment  9.8  2.1  21.7  4.3  1.3  0.1  0.4 
Electronics  17.4  4.5  39.6  10.4  2.7  -0.2  -0.1 
Machinery n.e.c.  10.8  1.4  23.4  2.9  0.3  -0.1  -0.1 
Manufacturing 
n.e.c.  -0.6  0.3  -1.6  0.3  -0.1  0.2  0.1 
Utilities   -0.7  -0.1  -1.1  -0.2       
Construction  1.3  0.6  2.7  1.3  0.1     
Trade  0.1    0.3  0.1       
Transport  -1.6  -0.5  -3.6  -1.3  -0.4  -0.1  0.1 
Financial services  -1.1  -0.7  -2.4  -1.4  -0.1     
Public 
administration  -0.3    -0.6         
Source: Model simulations. 
Table 9 presents the impact of Single Market on factor rewards in Poland and Hungary. The 
returns to factors in the EU do not change except for a 0.1% rise of wages of both types of workers 
in Austria and 0.1% rise of land rent in Netherlands and a 0.1% fall in wages of unskilled workers in 
Portugal. In Poland and Hungary all factors benefit from accession to the internal market. Relative 
wages of unskilled workers increase as production expands in unskilled labour-intensive sectors.  
The return to capital rises more in Hungary than in Poland, because the Single Market access 
leads to expansion of capital-intensive sectors in this country. 
Table 9. Impact of the Single Market access on factor rewards (% changes) – ACC100, IRTS scenario 
  Hungary  Poland 
Land  2.6  1.4 
Skilled Labour   3.2  2.1 
Unskilled Labour  3.7  2.3 
Capital  3  2 
Source: Model simulations. 
In several EU countries output changes are very small (less than 0.5%) and therefore not 
reported  in  Table  8.  This  is  perhaps  not  surprising,  as  the  Polish  and  Hungarian  markets  are 
relatively small for the EU countries so the potential gains from reduction in real costs of trade are 
not big. In addition the expansion of those sectors in the CEECs reduces imports from the EU. The  
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expansion  of  Electronic  Equipment  and  Machinery  and  Equipment  in  Austria  is  due  to  higher 
investment demand in Poland and Hungary.  
6. Steady state scenarios 
The calculation of steady state growth effects follows HRT (1996a). In the above scenarios the 
price of capital was allowed to vary within each country, while capital stock was held constant. In 
the steady state scenario capital stock in each country is allowed to adjust, while the price of 
capital in each country is held constant. This approach is in the spirit of the equilibrium concept in 
multisectoral planning models as proposed by Hansen and Koopmans (1972) and Dantzig and 
Manne (1974). It assumes that there exists an invariant capital stock equilibrium. It is defined as a 
set of prices, production and investment levels for which the economy is able to grow at a steady 
rate with constant relative prices.  
I follow HRT (1996a) by defining the optimal capital stock as the capital stock such that the 
cost of investment, including depreciation and interest, is exactly equal to the capital rental rate. 
However, the commodity composition of investment is not modelled explicitly. Instead I use the 
assumption  that  the  price  of  capital  within  each  region  is  equal  to  the  price  of  a  basket  of 
consumption  goods.  Further,  it  is  assumed  that  given  the  return  to  capital  in  benchmark 
equilibrium, the capital stock in each country is optimal. The steady state calculation fixes the price 
of capital and allows the capital stock to find an endogenous level.  
This  approach  provides  an  upper  bound  of  the  potential  welfare  gains  as  it  ignores  the 
adjustment  costs  and  foregone  consumption  necessary  to  increase  investment.  For  sufficiently 
high  discount  rates  the  costs  of  forgone  consumption  could  overturn  the  benefits  of  capital 
accumulation. Baldwin (1992) suggests that that the welfare effect is much smaller than the output 
effect  for  this  component  of  the  gains.  Although  in  the  steady  state  scenarios  we  continue  to 
measure  welfare  as  equivalent  variation  as  a  share  of  GDP,  it  has  to  be  born  in  mind  that 
incorporation of the cost of the investment required to build up the capital stock may substantially 
reduce  the  estimates  of  welfare  gains  cited  below.  On  the  other  hand  our  approach  does  not 
incorporate the potential gains due to productivity improvements or endogenous growth theory 
“learning by doing” effects.  
Given that in the static scenario the return to capital in the CEECs increases as a result of 
accession, the capital stock in this region is no longer optimal and expands to bring the rate of 
return to capital to the benchmark level. The expansion of the capital stock increases the amount 
of resources in the economy and generates output growth.  
In  the  following  section  I  discuss  the  steady  state  implications  of  the  joint  scenario,  which 
includes the adoption of the CET and the Single Market access. Further, I incorporate additional 
benefits of standardisation. I do not analyse the steady state impact of the customs union, as this 
scenario was only for illustrative purposes and is not a realistic representation of the outcome of 
enlargement.  
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6.1 The enlargement scenario 
The enlargement scenario combines two scenarios analysed in previous sections - i.e. the 
adoption of the CET and reduction of border and standards costs. I will also refer to it as the “base 
case scenario”. The first column of Table 10, where no change in standards and border costs is 
assumed, presents the steady state welfare effects of the adoption of the CET. The analysis of 
detailed production, trade and pricing patterns reveals the same story as in the static scenario, with 
the only exception that the capital stock is allowed to grow or contract to the level that keeps the 
price of capital at its benchmark value. This magnifies the static welfare effects. The expansion or 
contraction of the capital stock works as an endowment effect, so that with more resources to be 
employed larger welfare gains are generated.  
Table 10. Welfare effects of the adoption of the CET and the reduction in border and standards costs 
(equivalent variation as a percent of GDP) 
  ACC0  ACC25  ACC50  ACC75  ACC100  ACC0  ACC25  ACC50  ACC75  ACC100 
  CRTS  IRTS 
EU15    0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03 
Austria  -0.005  0.034  0.068  0.105  0.145  -0.004  0.046  0.083  0.126  0.173 
Rest of the  EU  -0.006  0.007  0.012  0.017  0.02  0.002  0.012  0.015  0.02  0.024 
France  0.004  0.014  0.009  0.001  -0.006  0.019  0.023  0.012  0.001  -0.01 
Germany  -0.023  -0.002  0.012  0.026  0.041  -0.017  0.003  0.017  0.033  0.05 
Great Britain  0.013  0.02  0.018  0.017  0.014  0.028  0.031  0.026  0.023  0.018 
Greece  -0.004  0.008  0.009  0.003  0.006  -0.003  -0.001  0.008  0.005  0.008 
Portugal  -0.005  -0.006  -0.005  -0.003  -0.002  -0.004  -0.005  -0.004  -0.003  -0.002 
Spain  0.005  0.013  0.012  0.008  0.003  0.018  0.023  0.015  0.009  0.003 
Italy  0.017  0.038  0.042  0.044  0.046  0.048  0.063  0.061  0.062  0.063 
Netherlands  -0.011  0.004  0.011  0.017  0.023  -0.004  0.011  0.015  0.021  0.027 
Hungary  0.437  1.762  3.17  4.686  6.317  0.554  2.015  3.528  5.189  6.974 
Poland  0.286  0.906  1.563  2.26  2.999  0.386  1.082  1.808  2.583  3.407 
CEECs-5  -0.004  -0.034  -0.062  -0.091  -0.121  -0.004  -0.015  -0.066  -0.096  -0.128 
FSU  0.01  0.011  0.004  0.003  -0.009  0.016  0.011  0.005  -0.004  -0.014 
ROW  0.07  0.074  0.063  0.05  0.037  0.088  0.084  0.067  0.052  0.035 
ACC25 – 25% reduction in border and standards costs 
ACC100 – 100% reduction in border and standards costs 
Source: Model simulations. 
The welfare and output effects of full abolition of standards and border costs and adoption of 
the  CET  represent  an  upper  bound  of  possible  implications  of  Single  Market  enlargement.  As 
already discussed above the full abolition of “sand in the gears” did not materialise in the case of 
the  EU  and  is  not  a  realistic  assumption.    According  to  my  model,  the  upper  limit  of  benefits 
amounts to a sizeable 7% of GDP in Hungary and to 3.4% in Poland. The CEECs left outside the  
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enlarged Union and the FSU lose slightly due to trade diversion. The impact on the EU is positive, 
except for Portugal. The economies which trade most with Hungary and Poland (i.e. Austria, Italy 
and  Germany)  record  small  welfare  gains  (0.17%,  0.06%  and  0.05%  respectively).  Portugal 
experiences a negligible welfare loss. Portugal specialises in exports of similar products as Poland 
and Hungary, so better access to the EU market for the new member states leads to reduction of 
demand for Portuguese goods. 
Table 11. Output changes resulting from a 50% reduction and full abolition of border and standards 
costs and adoption of the CET (IRTS scenario) 
  ACC50  ACC100 
  Hungary  Poland  Hungary  Poland  Austria  France  Germany  Italy 
Agriculture  -0.2  -1.4  0.3  -1  -0.1       
Raw materials  -0.5  0.4  -1.7  0.2  0.2  0.5  0.2  0.2 
Food  2.7  -0.3  4.9  0.6      -0.1   
Textiles  1.1  3.6  2.4  7.1  0.8    0.4   
Clothing  0.7  7.3  1.2  13.8  0.6  -0.2  -0.6  -0.1 
Leather  0.4  -1.7  1.4  0.4  -0.3    -0.3  -0.2 
Wood  2  5.3  4  9  -0.4  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1 
Paper  0.7  -0.3  1.6  -0.5  0.4    0.2  0.1 
Petroleum  2.3  -0.4  4.4  -0.4  0.1    0.1   
Chemicals  0.5  -0.4  1.3  -0.5  0.7  0.1  0.3  0.1 
Non-metallic Min.  1.1  0.7  1.7  0.8  0.3  0.1  0.2  0.1 
Iron, steel  5.6  2.7  11.3  3.8  -0.1  -0.2    0.2 
Other metals  7.3  6.4  15.4  9.5  0.8  -0.1  0.1  0.5 
Metal products  3.9  1.5  8.1  3.3  0.1  -0.2    0.3 
Motor vehicles  23.1  9.6  48.1  19.5  -0.4  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1 
Other transport 
equipment 
12.7  1.5  26.3  4.7  1.1  0.2  0.5  0.4 
Electronics  24.1  5.4  50.3  13.4  2.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.1 
Machinery n.e.c.  15.2  2.5  30.3  5.4  0.2  -0.1    0.3 
Manufacturing n.e.c.  0.7  -0.3  2  1  0.1      0.2 
Utilities   1.9  1.1  3.8  2.1  0.1      0.1 
Construction  4.1  2  7.9  3.7  0.1    0.1  0.1 
Trade  2.6  1.5  5.1  2.9  0.1      0.1 
Transport  1.3  1.8  2  2.1  -0.2    -0.1   
Financial services  2.4  1  4.7  1.9  0.1      0.1 
Public administration  1.6  0.5  3.3  1.1  0.2       
Source: Model simulations.  
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The sectoral implications of a 50% reduction and full elimination of border and standards costs 
and adoption of the CET are presented in Table 11. The pattern of results is similar to the static 
scenario of the Single Market access (Table 8). However, changes in output are magnified. Again 
in Poland and Hungary, sectors gaining most from accession include Motor Vehicles, Electronic 
Equipment, Other Metals, Textiles and Clothing. When border and standards costs are halved 
output  of  Electronic  Equipment  and  Motor  Vehicles  in  Hungary  expands  by  24%  and  23% 
respectively.  In  Poland  the  production  of  Motor  Vehicles  increases  by  almost  10%,  while 
production of Clothing expands by 7%. 
The impact on production in the remaining regions never reaches 1% of the pre-accession 
output level even in case of full elimination of border and standard costs. In this scenario Austria, 
France,  Germany  and  the  CEECs-5  record  a  small  fall  in  production  of  Motor  Vehicles  and 
Clothing as a result of expansion of these sectors in Poland and Hungary. However, the output of 
selected  sectors  such  as  Electronic  Equipment,  Other  Transport  Equipment  and  Non-Ferrous 
Metals increases in Austria, Germany and Italy. 
The full abolition of border and standards costs and the adoption of the CET have serious 
implications for the trade flows. Following liberalisation, markups in IRTS sectors and prices fall 
significantly resulting in trade expansion. Total exports of Poland increase by 16%; an increase is 
recorded in all sectors except for Utilities and Financial Services. Hungarian exports increase by 
19% and only Agriculture, Raw Materials and all service sectors record a fall in exports. Imports in 
all sectors increase significantly. Total imports increase by 14% in Poland and by 18% in Hungary. 
The trade balance is held fixed in the simulations. There is a clear trade diversion of Polish and 
Hungarian exports to EU markets away from the ROW. This is because the reduction of border 
and standards costs does not affect trade with the ROW. The overall increase in imports from the 
EU is greater than imports from the ROW in the case of Hungary. The opposite is true in the case 
of Poland. This is mainly because in Poland adoption of the CET leads to a substantial reduction in 
tariffs on ROW imports, while Hungarian pre-accession tariffs were already quite low.  
The impact of enlargement on EU trade is very small. Only Austria and Germany record minor 
falls in imports and exports with the EU15 of 1% and a similar increase in trade with non-EU15 
countries. Also, exports of Italy, Netherlands and Portugal to non-EU15 countries increase by 1%. 
However, the impact on selected sectors is quite sizeable. For example the exports of Electronic 
Equipment  from  Austria  rise  by  5%,  while  imports  increase  by  3%.  Imports  of  Raw  Materials 
increase between 2-4% in Austria, Germany, Spain and Italy. Imports of Motor Vehicles to Greece 
rise  by  13%.  Greece  increases  imports  of  Motor  Vehicles  from  Poland  and  Hungary,  where 
enlargement leads to fall in prices and expansion of production. The detailed results on the trade 
implications of this scenario are presented in Appendix D. 
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Table 12. Impact of the Single Market on factor rewards (% changes) – IRTS scenario 
  ACC50  ACC1000 
  Hungary   Poland  Hungary  Poland  CEECs-5  Austria  Germany  Italy 
Land  1.3  -1  4.1  0.8  -0.1  0  0  0 
Skilled Labour   2.9  1.7  5.7  3.4  -0.1  0.1  0  0.1 
Unskilled Labour  3.2  1.7  6.4  3.4  -0.2  0.1  0  0.1 
Change in capital 
stock  4.8  2.2  9.4  4.5  -0.21  0.185  0.035  0.088 
Source: Model simulations. 
In  the  steady  state  scenario  when  border  and  standards  costs  are  halved,  real  wages  of 
unskilled  workers  increase  by  1.7%  in  Poland  and  3.2%  in  Hungary.  The  relative  wages  of 
unskilled workers rise, as production shifts towards unskilled labour-intensive sectors. The return to 
land follows changes in the production of agriculture. It rises in Hungary and falls in Poland. As 
production in several manufacturing capital-intensive sectors expands, the return to capital rises in 
the static scenario. In the steady state the capital stock is allowed to adjust to bring the price of 
capital to its benchmark level. The capital stock increases by 4.8% in Hungary and by 2.2% in 
Poland.  
Factor rewards in the EU change by very little. The biggest changes are recorded in Austria 
and Italy, whose share of trade with the CEECs is significantly above the EU average. The impact 
on the CEECs-5 is negative, but close to nil.  
6.2 The enlargement scenario with increased substitution possibilities 
This section looks at the extension of the previous scenario by including additional benefits of 
standardisation. Standards can be decomposed into uniformity and product quality standards. Both 
types of standards serve to significantly increase the substitution possibilities of buyers. Uniformity 
standards enable consumers to use products interchangeably, while quality standards reduce the 
market power of brand names allowing for greater substitutability among products.  
Following the adoption of EU standards and regulations all CEEC producers will be able to sell 
their products in the enlarged EU. This should improve the diversity of products available to EU 
consumers.  Also  with  full  adoption  of  the  acquis  the  fears  of  current  EU  citizens  about 
environmental or social dumping should be greatly reduced. As a result EU consumers are likely to 
view the products from new member states as increasingly similar to the goods produced within 
the borders of the EU15. Also, in the CEECs, products imported from the EU15 will be viewed as 
better substitutes to domestic varieties. This is essentially because the CEEC goods which do not 
comply yet with the EU standards and regulations will need to change.6 It has to be born in mind 
                                                  
6 Some products in the CEECs were granted transition periods during which they do not need to comply with the EU 
regulations, as long as they are sold only on the domestic market e.g. milk in Poland. However, transition periods were 
granted only to a limited number of goods.   
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that this does not necessarily mean that domestic products were seen as worse or better than EU 
products before accession. However, their characteristics are likely to become more similar when 
Polish and Hungarian products satisfy the same standards and technical requirements as goods 
imported from the EU.  
Summing up, this scenario assumes that as a result of harmonisation of standards consumers 
will be able to substitute more easily between products from old and new member states. In the 
base case scenario consumers are assumed to possess weakly separable utility functions, which 
allow  multiple  stage  budgeting  of  their  consumption  decisions  as  illustrated  in  Figure  1.  First, 
consumers choose between different composite goods based on a Cobb-Douglas utility function.  
Then consumers choose between domestic and imported goods within a given composite, based 
on  a  CES  sub-utility  function.  And  finally  consumers  choose  between  products  from  different 
regions based on a CES sub-utility function. In the scenario modelled in this section consumers 
have  a  different  structure  of  preferences  to  reflect  the  fact  that  products  in  the  enlarged  EU 
became better substitutes for each other as a result of standardisation. The preference structure is 
still very similar to that depicted in Figure 1. The major difference is that domestic variety now 
includes not only the varieties produced in a home country, but all other EU products as well. The 
elasticities of substitution remain unchanged, but with the inclusion of other EU products in the 
domestic composite the elasticity of substitution between domestic and other EU products changes 
from  5  (elasticity  of  substitution  between  domestic  and  imported  varieties)  to  15  (elasticity  of 
substitution between domestic varieties). I follow the approach of HRT (1994) in modelling the 
changes in preferences over a continuum where at the limit all EU consumers view domestic and 
imported EU products as equally substitutable. 
The two preference structures discussed above present two extreme views of the demand 
structure. I choose to model the path towards full recognition of varieties from other EU countries 
as home varieties as a weighted average of these two approaches. The assumption that 50% of 
the EU market is integrated means that 50% of EU consumers in each EU country perceive no 
change in the substitutability of EU varieties, while 50% view EU produced varieties as equally 
substitutable with home varieties. A similar approach was adopted by HRT (1994), however the 
major  difference  is  that  in  HRT  (1994)  the  benchmark  level  of  integration  is  zero,  because  it 
represents the EC before 1992. If indeed the Single Market program led to better substitutability 
between EU products as postulated in Appendix C, then at the time of enlargement this change in 
preference structures must already be taken into account.  
It seems that full integration is unlikely ever to take place, as there will always be some bias 
toward domestically produced goods. I assume that the share of standards approved is a good 
proxy for the level of integration of EU markets in the sense discussed above. By October 1997 the 
number of standards approved in all EU member states amounted to only 32% of the total number 
of mandated standards. I expect that further efforts of the EU countries will raise the share of 
adopted standards to 50% by the time of enlargement. Therefore I assume that in the benchmark 
the initial level of integration is an arbitrary 50%. The change of preferences does not affect the  
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benchmark  SAMs,  but  it  affects  the  number  of  firms  and  markups  in  the  EU  countries.  The 
markups on domestic markets are higher as compared to the base scenario, while markups on 
foreign markets are lower.  
The intuition into how integration affects markups can be gained by the examination of the 
markup equations derived in Appendix A. The markup for firms from one EU country (r) selling into 
another EC country (s) in the segmented market situation is denoted mrs
SEG  and mrs
INT in a fully 
integrated  equilibrium.  Following  equations  (44)  and  (45)  in  Appendix  A  the  markup  under 









































and the markup under integrated markets is as follows: 
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where  
σDD – elasticity of substitution between varieties supplied by domestic firms  
σMM – elasticity of substitution between products of any two foreign suppliers  
σDM – elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties 
Nr – number of firms producing in region r 
θrs – the market share of region r firms in region s 
θs
EU – the market share of supply from the EU in region s 
θs
M – the market share of imports in region s. 
 
When  expression  (3)  is  negative  the  markups  will  fall  relative  to  the  segmented  market 
equilibrium and ceteris paribus intra-EU trade will expand. Given our assumption about the values 
of elasticities (see section 3.3 of Appendix A) the first term in equation (1) is negative (-0.033), but 
the sign of the second term is ambiguous. The second term will be positive the smaller is θs
EU in 
relation to θs
M, i.e. the smaller the share of EU firms on the domestic market relative to non-EU 
imports.  Given the assumptions about the elasticities of substitution the change in markup is as 
follows: 
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Numerically, I find that the sign of the second term is positive in most cases, but smaller than 
the first term, so that the overall change in the markup on other EU markets is negative in all 
cases. The decline in markup is in most cases between 1.5 and 2 percentage points. 
The change in markups charged on the domestic market is negative in all cases. Again the 
difference  between  integrated  and  segmented  market  markups  can  also  be  derived  using  the 













































The  difference  between  elasticities  is  positive  (0.13),  while  the  second  term  is  positive  if 
θrr>θr
EU, i.e. when the home market share of domestic firms is higher than the share of imports 
from  all  EU  countries.  This  is  always  the  case,  so  the  second  term  is  positive  and,  following 
integration, markups charged by domestic firms on domestic market increase. In other words when 
other EU goods are viewed as equally substitutable with domestic goods, the share of domestically 
produced goods decreases and with falling production markups need to be increased in order to 
cover fixed costs.  
In the enlargement scenario I assume that Poland and Hungary become equally integrated 
with current EU members, i.e. that 50% of consumers in the old member states view Polish and 
Hungarian  products  as  equally  substitutable  with  domestic  varieties  and  vice  versa.  This  is  in 
addition to the modelling of the adoption of the CET and elimination of border and standards costs. 
With  market  integration  the  perceived  elasticity  of  demand  of  EU  firms  on  intra-EU  exports 
increases and price margins on intra-EU trade fall endogenously leading to expansion of intra-EU 
trade. Firms in CRTS sectors are also affected due to general equilibrium effects of the changing 
prices in IRTS sectors. When additional benefits of standardisation are assumed, the prices of 
goods fall even further following accession, so the resulting welfare gains are higher. 
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Table 13. Welfare effects of enlargement with increased substitution possibilities (equivalent 






  ACC0  ACC25  ACC50  ACC75  ACC100  ACC100 
EU15  0.07  0.09  0.12  0.15  0.18  0.03 
Austria  0.06  0.101  0.149  0.202  0.265  0.173 
Rest of the  EU  0.023  0.031  0.04  0.051  0.062  0.024 
France  0.019  0.012  0.003  -0.005  -0.015  -0.01 
Germany  0.013  0.026  0.042  0.058  0.077  0.05 
Great Britain  0.031  0.029  0.028  0.026  0.024  0.018 
Greece  0.001  0.004  0.008  0.012  0.016  0.008 
Portugal  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.016  -0.002 
Spain  0.019  0.016  0.014  0.006  0.009  0.003 
Italy  0.079  0.081  0.086  0.09  0.095  0.063 
Netherlands  0.024  0.035  0.048  0.062  0.078  0.027 
Hungary  2.997  4.617  6.417  8.413  10.632  6.974 
Poland  1.62  2.321  3.098  3.956  4.906  3.407 
CEECs-5  -0.057  -0.077  -0.097  -0.117  -0.136  -0.128 
FSU  0.005  0.006  -0.004  -0.009  -0.013  -0.014 
ROW  0.072  0.06  0.049  0.036  0.023  0.035 
Source: model simulations – see text. 
The  gains  from  standardisation  are  substantial.  When  domestic  treatment  of  Polish  and 
Hungarian products by half of the EU consumers and vice versa is allowed, the upper bound of 
welfare gains rises by 1.5 percentage points in Poland, by 3.6 percentage points in Hungary and 
by 0.15 percentage points in the EU. In all countries and regions the welfare gains or losses are 
magnified relative to the base case scenario, but the pattern of results remains unchanged.  
When standards and border costs are halved, the prices of most manufacturing products fall. 
The  highest  price  reduction  in  Poland  is  recorded  in  Wearing  Apparel  and  Leather  (-3%).  In 
Hungary the greatest price cuts are expected in Motor Vehicles (-4.5%), Machinery and Equipment 
(-3.5%), as well as Electronic Equipment and Other transport equipment (around -3%). Similar 
changes in prices of those sectors are expected to materialise in Poland.  
The  simulated  changes  in  trade  flows  and  output  are  at  least  twice  as  big  as  in  the 
enlargement scenario. Table 14 displays the implications of the present scenario for output. It is 
interesting to note that even huge shifts in production in the CEECs do not lead to any significant 
changes in output of the EU.  
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Table 14. Output changes in enlargement scenario with increased substitution possibilities (IRTS 
scenario) 
  ACC50  ACC100 
  Hungary  Poland  Hungary  Poland  Austria  France  Germany  Portugal 
Agriculture  -0.6  -1.5  -1.1  -1.9  0  0.1  0.1  0.1 
Raw materials  -2  -0.1  -3.3  -0.3  -0.2  0.7  0.2  1.2 
Food  5.5  0.2  7.6  0.5  -0.3  -0.2  0.1  0 
Textiles  -4.2  4.6  -5  8  0.9  0.2  0.6  -0.1 
Clothing  -6.3  8.5  -8.1  16.4  1.3  -0.2  -0.8  -0.3 
Leather  -6.8  -1  -7.9  0.2  0  0.1  -0.1  0.2 
Wood  -0.8  5.2  -0.6  9.9  -0.4  -0.1  -0.4  0 
Paper  -3.1  -3.2  -4.3  -5  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.1 
Petroleum  3.8  -3.7  6.2  -4.7  -0.5  0.1  0.2  0 
Chemicals  -3.5  -4.1  -4.9  -5.9  1.2  0.2  0.6  0 
Non-metallic Min.  -1  -1.1  -3.1  -2.4  0.5  0.2  0.3  0.3 
Iron, steel  11.3  4.9  17.3  6.1  0.2  -0.2  0.2  -0.4 
Other metals  17.6  13.7  27.8  18  1.4  -0.7  -0.1  -0.5 
Metal products  6.2  4  8.8  5.7  0.6  -0.3  -0.2  0.5 
Motor vehicles  68.4  28.1  117.4  47.9  -0.8  -0.8  -0.6  -1.5 
Other transport  27.8  6.4  47.2  11.2  2.2  0.1  0.5  0.1 
Electronics  46.4  11.9  88.6  24.3  1.8  -0.6  -0.5  -0.4 
Machinery n.e.c.  26.1  4.2  46.8  7.9  0.6  -0.2  0.1  -0.1 
Manufacturing n.e.c.  -3.1  -0.3  -5.2  -0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0 
Utilities   3.2  2  5.1  3.2  0.2  0  0.1  0 
Construction  7.5  3.4  12.1  5.4  0.2  0  0.1  0 
Trade  5.4  2.8  9.1  4.5  0.2  0  0  0 
Transport  4.2  4.8  5  5.5  -0.2  0  0.1  0 
Financial services  3.7  1.3  6  2  0.1  0  0.1  0.1 
Public administration  4  1.1  6.7  1.9  0.2  0  0.1  0 
Source: Model simulations. 
When we allow for greater substitution between domestic and imported goods, the expansion 
of capital stock is much higher than in the enlargement scenario. In case of full abolition of border 
and standards costs it amounts to 14.6% in Hungary and 6.1% in Poland. The wages of unskilled 
workers improve in real terms by 9.3% in Hungary and 4.7% in Poland. Changes in wages of other 
countries are negative in some cases, but negligible. This is to be expected, as the impact of 
enlargement on output of the EU is very small.  
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7. Sensitivity analysis 
This section is dedicated to the sensitivity analysis of the main results of the model - i.e. the 
welfare  implications  of  enlargement  in  the  steady  state  (base  case)  scenario.  I  look  at  the 
implications of two variations in the parameters of the model, a change in the nature of competition 
in  IRTS  sectors  and  two  changes  in  the  assumptions  about  the  costs  of  harmonisation  of 
standards. The first scenario looks at the adoption of the CET and Single Market access using the 
middle value for estimated cost disadvantage ratio (CDR - see section 3.5 of Appendix A). In the 
next scenario the assumed values for the elasticities of substitution are halved. The third simulation 
changes the nature of competition to firm-level competition as depicted in Figure 2.  The final two 
scenarios assume that in order to comply with EU standards and regulations producers in Poland 
and Hungary are forced to make additional investments equivalent to 0.5% (scenario 4) and 1% 
(scenario 5) of value added.  
In  case  of  the  first  three  scenarios  I  re-calibrate  the  benchmark  equilibrium  to  the  new 
parameters, as well as using them in the counterfactual simulations. This means that the Hicksian 
equivalent variation measure of welfare is well defined, as the new structure of demand reproduces 
the initial benchmark equilibrium without any changes. Given prices, income and quantity choices 
the initial data point can be calibrated as an optimum for any value of the elasticity of substitution. 
The  changes  of  elasticities  in  sensitivity  analysis  alter  the  curvature  of  the  utility  function  in 
benchmark equilibrium and affect the results of counterfactual scenarios, but they do not change 
the initial optimum point of consumption.    
The first scenario assumes much greater unrealised economies of scale. The differences are 
significant, as for example the assumed CDRs increase from 8 to 14 in the Other Transportation 
Equipment or from 5 to 9 in Non-Metallic Minerals as compared to the base case scenario. With 
higher unrealised economies of scale the calibrated number of firms is much smaller and markups 
charged by them are higher. The liberalisation of trade leads to a stronger increase in competition 
and more significant fall in prices than in the base case scenario, as the slope of average cost 
curve is steeper in the medium CDR scenario. The greater the absolute value of a decline in the 
markup the larger will be the welfare benefits from rationalisation and consumption efficiency. The 
results of the experiment with medium values of CDR are presented in column 2 of Table 15. 
Indeed, all regions record much higher welfare gains as compared to the base case scenario. The 
additional gain for the EU amounts to 0.4 percentage points and to 0.8 and 0.4 percentage points 
in case of Hungary and Poland respectively. Countries with high shares of trade with Poland and 
Hungary such as Italy, Germany, Netherlands and France gain between 0.4-0.6% of GDP. In this 
scenario some EU countries gain more than Poland. This is mainly a feature of modelling, as we 
assume  that  further  harmonisation  of  law  between  the  current  EU  member  states  leads  to 
reduction of border and standard costs in trade between themselves. The impact of lowering of 
trade costs within EU15 has greater impact on prices and welfare under the assumption of medium 
CDR than in the base case scenario.  
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In the second scenario the elasticities of substitution are scaled down by 50%, so that the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic varieties is equal to 7.5, between imported varieties to 5 
and between domestic and imported goods to 2.5. With lower values of elasticities, the benchmark 
markups are almost twice as high as in the base case scenario and changes in prices following 
enlargement are smaller. This is also the case of changes in output, which in case of greater 
product differentiation tend to be lower. Smaller changes in prices and output are associated with 
lower welfare gains, as indicated in column 3 of Table 15. The welfare gains for Hungary and for 
Poland are 2.1 and 0.6 percentage points lower than in the base case. Although the elasticities of 
substitution are crucial for the results, I cannot base the modelling effort on estimates of those 
elasticities for Europe or the CEECs, as to my best knowledge there are no estimates based on the 
demand structure used in this model. It is important to note that the results of HRT (1994) were 
very close to the results of other studies using very dissimilar methodologies to evaluate the impact 
of Europe 1992 (see HRT, 1994, p. 33-39). This in my view supports their choice of methodology 
and assumptions about the crucial parameters. Using the assumptions about the elasticities of 
substitution  employed  by  HRT  (1994)  allows  also  for  comparisons  between  the  impact  of 
accession to the Single Market by Poland and Hungary to the impact of the creation of the Single 
Market in 1992. 
The third scenario looks at the implications of firm-level competition, which is independent of 
country  of  origin.  This  amounts  to  choosing  the  same  value  for  the  elasticity  of  substitution 
between varieties supplied by domestic firms (σDD), the elasticity of substitution between products 
of any two foreign suppliers (σMM) and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported 
varieties (σDM). In this scenario the value chosen is equal to the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties supplied by domestic firms from the base case, i.e. 15. This scenario is similar to the 
market integration scenario, except that now products of all (not only EU) firms are viewed as 
equally substitutable with domestic varieties. In a new benchmark domestic firms charge higher 
markups on the domestic market. At the same time there is an increase in the perceived elasticity 
of demand on the home market. Therefore foreign markets induce domestic firms to charge lower 
markups. Fiercer competition results in bigger changes in prices and output following enlargement 
and greater welfare gains. Hungary gains an additional 1 percentage point, while welfare gains for 
Poland amount to only 0.12%.  
Table 15. Welfare effects of enlargement under various assumptions – AC100, IRTS steady state 
scenarios (equivalent variation as a percent of GDP) 









competition  0.5%  1% 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
EU15  0.03  0.41  0.04  0.06  0.03  0.03 
Austria  0.173  0.233  0.164  0.219  0.171  0.167 
Rest of the  EU  0.024  0.324  0.031  0.063  0.024  0.023  
               Studies & Analyses No. 273 – EU Enlargement: Benefits of the Single Market Expansion.. 
40 
France  -0.01  0.484  0.012  0.023  -0.009  -0.011 
Germany  0.05  0.42  0.06  0.064  0.05  0.048 
Great Britain  0.018  0.269  0.026  0.038  0.018  0.016 
Greece  0.008  0.172  0.008  0.022  0.008  0.008 
Portugal  -0.002  0.165  0.001  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003 
Spain  0.003  0.381  0.018  0.032  0.003  0.003 
Italy  0.063  0.607  0.073  0.105  0.062  0.06 
Netherlands  0.027  0.445  0.04  0.078  0.027  0.018 
Hungary  6.974  7.778  4.863  8.059  6.292  5.629 
Poland  3.407  3.791  2.763  3.527  2.549  1.714 
CEECs-5  -0.128  0.142  -0.088  -0.076  -0.127  -0.126 
FSU  -0.014  0.242  0.007  0.002  -0.017  -0.02 
ROW  0.035  0.358  0.043  0.052  0.035  0.033 
Source: model simulations – see text. 
Further I look at two more experiments. In the earlier modelling of the Single Market access I 
assume that as soon as products certified for use in Poland and Hungary will be accepted for sale 
in the EU the costs of testing and certification of goods for exports to the EU will fall. However, 
there  is  a  possibility  that  more  stringent  than  local  regulations  will  impose  additional  costs  on 
production for the domestic markets of the CEECs. The standard costs for the EU countries before 
completion of the Single Market oscillated between 0 and 2%. The estimated costs of compliance 
with EU regulations in Poland amounted to 0.5%-2% of annual sales (IKCHZ, 2002).7 Therefore I 
look  at  two  scenarios where  the additional  value  added  in  production  for  the  domestic market 
amounts  to  0.5%  and  1%  of  the  initial  value  added.  As  expected  the  welfare  implications  of 
additional costs of production for the domestic market are negative and significant. In the case of 
the 1% increase in value added (column 6 of Table 15) the welfare gain of Poland is almost halved, 
while  Hungary  loses  1.3  percentage  points  relative  to  the  base  case.  Since  all  of  the  firms 
exporting to the EU and firms with relatively new production technologies already comply with EU 
standards and regulations, it seems that the likely impact on the rise of costs of production for the 
domestic market will be in the rage of 0-0.5%. It therefore should not have a big impact on the 
welfare implications of enlargement. 
Overall the level of unrealised economies of scale or the nature of competition do not affect the 
welfare  implications  of  enlargement  very  much.  However,  one  has  to  bear  in  mind  that  the 
parameters employed in the modelling work such that the elasticities of substitution in demand are 
important determinants of the results. This points to the need for more research on the specific 
demand functions and their parameters in the CEECs. 
                                                  
7 Unfortunately, this study covers only a very small sample of firms (25 of them provided the costs of compliance), so 
it cannot be used to formulate sector specific assumptions regarding the cost of compliance with EU regulations.   
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8. Discussion of the results 
The results of this paper are not directly comparable to studies by Brown et al. (1995) and 
Baldwin, Francois and Portes (BFP 1995) and Francois (1998), as all of these studies include the 
Europe Agreements as part of the enlargement scenario. In addition, these studies had the 1992 
database as the benchmark, when trade barriers between Poland and the EU were very high. This 
significantly  increases  the  gains  from  accession.  I  cite  the  results  of  those  studies  only  as  a 
reference.  
The impact of Single Market access can be compared to the Brown et al. (1995) scenario D, 
where all tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers to trade in industrial goods are removed. The authors’ 
estimates indicate that the gains for Poland and Hungary amount to about 5.6 and 6.8% of GDP.  
BFP (1997) and Francois (1998) study the impact of the customs union, adoption of the CET 
and across-the-board reduction of transaction costs of trade by 10%. According to their results the 
CEECs  gain  1%  of  GDP  due  to  static  efficiency  effect  and  an  additional  11.5%  due  to  pro-
competitive effect in IRTS sectors. The impact on the EU is very small as the sum of these two 
effects amounts to 0.2% of benchmark GDP.  
In the “less conservative” scenario BFP (1997) and Francois (1998) assume that in the long-
run the investment risk in the CEECs falls to the level of the investment risk of Portugal as a result 
of the EU membership. This is equivalent to a drop in the relative return on investment in this 
region  of  15%.  Reduced  investment  risk  induces  greater  investment  in  the  region.  The 
accumulation effect constitutes an additional source of welfare gain, which is quite substantial for 
the CEECs. It amounts to almost 20% of the benchmark GDP. This relatively high number is due to 
a predicted increase of capital stock in the CEECs of 68%. I conducted a similar experiment by 
looking at the implications of a 15% increase in the rate of return to capital in Poland and Hungary 
in addition to the adoption of the CET and complete abolition of standards and border costs. The 
results are of similar order of magnitude as those obtained by BFP (1997). The welfare in CEECs-7 
increases  by  18.8%,  while  in  my  model  Polish  welfare  increases  by  19.4%  and  Hungarian  by 
32.6%. This is associated with an increase of the capital stock of 47.5% in Poland and 68.5% in 
Hungary, compared to 68% estimated by BFP (1997) for the CEECs-7. This exercise serves as a 
robustness test for my model. It is reassuring that although BFP (1997) include the impact of EAs 
and use different model and earlier benchmark data, the orders of magnitude of results are similar.   
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Table 16. Comparison of welfare implications of enlargement with other general equilibrium studies 





Lejour, de Mooij, Nahuis (2001)  Baldwin, Francois, 
Portes (1997) 
  Equivalent variation as a 
% of GDP 
Volume of GDP (% change)  Volume of GDP  
(% change) 













  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
EU15  0.03  0.03  0  0.1  0.6  0.2  0.2 
CEECs-7      2.5  5.3  -1.8  1.5  18.8 
  Hungary  7.0  32.6  1.9  9  -1.3     
  Poland  3.4  19.4  4.3  5.8  -1.4     
  CEECs-5  -0.1  -0.1  1  3.4  -2.3     
FSU  0.0  0.1  0  0  0  1.1  0.6 
ROW  0.0  0.0  0  0  0     
* Elimination of estimated technical barriers to trade. 
** Customs union with CAP production in the EU kept at the pre-enlargement level plus 10% reduction in real costs of 
trade 
*** In addition to the above, risk premium of investment in the CEECs is reduced by 15%. 
The results of this study are directly comparable to the results of Lejour, de Mooij and Nahuis 
(LMN 2001), as translation of the enlargement into modelling assumptions is similar. There are two 
significant  differences  between  my  analysis  and  the  LMN  study.  The  first  difference  is  the 
modelling of the Single Market access, as LMN (2001) estimate the tariff equivalent of the barriers 
to trade between the EU and the CEECs with the use of gravity equations. Secondly, my analysis 
is based on lower protection levels in trade between Poland, Hungary and the EU, while the above 
authors employ the original GTAP v. 5 protection data. As a result LMN’s implications of accession 
also include the benefits stemming from the Europe Agreements. There are also some differences 
in the structure of the model used in this study and in LMN (2001). In the latter study all sectors are 
perfectly  competitive  and  the  modelling  of  capital  market  is  different.  The  WorldScan  model 
employed by LMN (2001) includes a portfolio mechanism in which capital owners distribute their 
investments  over  regions  depending  on  the  rates  of  return  and  the  preferences  for  assets 
diversification. 
According to LMN’s study the welfare implications of Single Market access amount to 9% of 
GDP for Hungary and 5.8% for Poland and between 0% and 0.1% for the EU. My results indicate 
that a steady state welfare implications of full abolition of standards and border costs amount to 7% 
for Hungary and 3.4% for Poland and 0% to 0.17% in the EU. Although these latter numbers also 
include the modelling of adoption of CET, the welfare contribution of this effect for Poland and 
Hungary is around 0.4-0.5%. Therefore the estimated welfare changes of my study are significantly 
smaller than those of LMN (2001). This is mainly due to lower protection data employed in my  
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study. The simulations not reported here show that my results become very close to LMN’s results 
when I use the original GTAP protection levels. Therefore mainly the data and not the methodology 
are responsible for the differences in results between those two studies.  
The sectoral effects of Single Market access of LMN (2001) also display a similar pattern to the 
results of this study. However, again the estimated changes in output are smaller according to my 
estimates. The direction of changes in output is consistent between those two studies, with only 
few exceptions. LMN also expect large increases of output in Transport Equipment and Electronic 
Equipment, Textiles, Leather, Machinery Equipment in Hungary and Poland. The results for other 
regions also display a high degree of similarity. The fact that sectoral results are similar despite 
significant differences in construction of the modelling exercise is very reassuring. It suggests that 
different ways of capturing Single Market access show a consistent picture of possible significant 
welfare gains for the acceding countries and modest welfare gains or negligible losses of welfare in 
the EU. The exact estimates of the welfare gains are very sensitive to the benchmark protection 
levels and I believe that the tariff data employed in my study constitute a better representation of 
the protection at the time of accession.  
9. Conclusions 
This  paper  looks  at  the  implications  of  Eastern  EU  enlargement  with  the  focus  on  Single 
Market access. It differs from previous studies in several respects. Firstly, I create a benchmark set 
of  social  accounting  matrices  at  the  time  of  accession  by  incorporating  the  provisions  of  the 
preferential trade agreements between Poland, Hungary and the EU and the UR commitments. 
Therefore,  I  am  able  to  avoid  the  inclusion  of  Europe  Agreements  as  part  of  the  accession 
scenario. Secondly, the Single Market access is modelled explicitly. The modelling assumptions 
regarding the reduction of costs of crossing the border and compliance with foreign regulations and 
standards are based on the literature on the completion of the Single Market in Europe. Finally, the 
paper includes a thorough sensitivity analysis regarding the main parameters of the model and 
modelling assumptions.  
The results of this study suggest that Eastern EU enlargement will be beneficial to the new 
members, while most EU countries will record minor welfare gains. Poland is expected to gain 
3.4% of GDP, while Hungary almost 7%. The new members will experience production increases 
across almost all sectors, while the impact on EU production in some sectors is negative, but very 
small. In Poland and Hungary real wages rise, with wages of unskilled workers increasing at a 
faster pace than wages of skilled workers. The welfare implications of accession are smaller than 
compared to other studies on this subject. Lejour, de Mooij and Nahuis (2001) find that the gains 
from the Single Market are equivalent to 9% of GDP in Hungary and 5.8% in Poland. Despite 
significant differences in methodology, the main reason for divergence of the results is that LMN 
(2001) employ higher trade protection data, which does not incorporate provisions of the Europe 
Agreements and other trade policy changes.   
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This study focuses on the impact of trade liberalisation and reduction of technical barriers to 
trade. A complete analysis of the impact of enlargement on existing and prospective members 
should clearly also include the implications of accession to the CAP and transfers from the EU 
budget such as Structural Funds.  
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